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Commentary & Reply
On "Defeating the Islamic State"
Jason W. Warren
This commentary is in response to BG(R) Huba Wass de Czege's article "Defeating
the Islamic State: Commentary on a Core Strategy" and Paul Rexton Kan's article
"Defeating the Islamic State: A Financial-Military Strategy" published in the Winter
2014-15 issue of Parameters (vol. 44, no. 4).

R

ecent articles concerning the defeat of ISIS by BG(R) Huba
Wass de Czege and Paul Rexton Kan in the Army’s flagship
journal Parameters seek to overturn Clausewitz’s assertion that
“War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” (On
War, 75) The United States and its allies will not defeat ISIS through
legitimacy-seeking-nation-building projects—for which the West does
not currently have the political will to execute over the long term—nor
by reducing ISIS’s financial networks and waging a law-enforcement
campaign against it. Host-peoples may perceive the West as arrogant in
assuming it can force the “legitimacy” of an Iraqi or Syrian government
on them. It would also be disingenuous to claim population-centric counterinsurgency operations, such as the “government in a box” proposed
by BG(R) Wass de Czege, is not nation building, as these operations seek
to clear the enemy, hold key terrain (and population centers), and build
national forces and government (including public infrastructure). This is
literally a description of nation building.
The most efficient way to combat ISIS is through the employment of
US conventional military power supported by the strongest allies available in the region, such as the Kurdish peshmerga. The obvious “solution”
is to fight fewer ill-advised conflicts in failed nation-states that have little
strategic value to the United States or its allies. However, when that is
not a possibility, the default option should not be population-centric
counterinsurgency. There are a number of successful pre-1945 examples
of counterinsurgency operations that have little to do with fostering
host-nation legitimacy or conducting financial “warfare.”
A social-science approach to warfare has overly influenced US
military doctrine. This approach, which trumpets “engagement” as a
warfighting function, seeks to redefine the nature of war. “Engaging”
other cultures with joint military exercises and training, officer exchanges,
and infrastructure projects, builds on a notion of counterinsurgency that
has negatively influenced more conventional doctrine, hinging strategic
success to the solidification of legitimacy for a host-nation government.
Building legitimacy, as espoused in FM 3-24, is beyond the scope of
US military operations. As conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
have demonstrated, infrastructure projects and the imposition of
“Western” rule of law on foreign peoples are fools’ errands. A former
Army company commander in Iraq recently challenged my claim
population-centric COIN had failed—until I asked him what happened
to the Iraqi government’s legitimacy as soon as US troops left the area.
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A casual survey of the news in America reveals problems with corruption, and it is folly to think predominantly military forces with a
sprinkling of interagency personnel can solve the intractable, centurieslong squabbles and injustices of other nations and peoples. History
offers many examples of failed operations in this vein from Alexander
the Great to the present.
Decision-makers tend to lack historical insight, however, and have
little knowledge of past events since 1945, let alone antiquity. Training a
military force in local culture and history, as community police, and for
civil engineering, is beyond the capabilities of all but elite US units. It
should thus come as little surprise that legitimacy-building efforts have
failed since 1960, and in fact proponents of population-centric COIN
cannot point to a single modern success, which begs the obvious question of why the United States continues to employ such methods. For
example, John Nagl’s assertion in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, that the
British succeeded in employing population-centric COIN in Malaysia
has been debunked as a “one-off” based less on counterinsurgency and
more on the de facto segregation of the Chinese insurgents (who were
thus already separated from the Malaysian population at large), as well
as the geographic situation of Malaysia.
Financial warfare and the use of law enforcement to confront adversaries like ISIS, are also only sideshows for the main event of armed
confrontation. ISIS fighters cannot be arrested in the conventional
sense, and the use of law enforcement to incarcerate Taliban and Al
Qaeda fighters has met with only mixed success on previous battlefields—many returned to the battlefield after incarceration.
Victory is achievable through the employment of conventional
forces accompanied by competent local allies, such as the Kurds. The
main emphasis must be the finding and fixing of ISIS, and their ultimate
destruction. Non-lethal counterinsurgency methods play a tangential
role in this endeavor. As Peter Mansoor establishes in his book Surge,
conventional forces employed during that phase of the Iraq campaign,
used more lethality than in previous operations there. In fact, the restive
Iraqi provinces imploded into sectarianism, and ISIS conquests soon
followed once US forces departed, indicating non-lethal legitimacy and
engagement had failed.
Special Operating Forces (SOF) and airpower (including drone
strikes) play a tangential role in targeting ISIS leaders. Although
SOF-Airpower will not win the war, it supports conventional ground
operations. As recent events in Yemen reveal, without conventional
forces’ protection and intelligence gathering, SOF cannot operate
effectively.
Examples of US conventional military power employed in the
Philippines, numerous incursions into Latin America from the 19th20th centuries, and Connecticut’s success in the Great Narragansett War
(King Philip’s War), all demonstrate how conventional power with competent local allies can defeat insurgents such as ISIS. Competent military
power, less concerned with legitimacy, nation building, law enforcement,
and financial warfare, did succeed in these cases, and would again, if the
United States were to unleash it in the Levant today.
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The Author Replies
Paul Rexton Kan

I

am not sure the diligent people at the US Department of Treasury
would take kindly in having their efforts to combat ISIS labeled as
“sideshows.” Be they Clausewitzian or not, their efforts to damage
ISIS’s ability to operate and form a functioning state are in the best
keeping of the American tradition of using all of our instruments of
national power to defeat an enemy.
There is little in my article suggesting a conventional military campaign would be ineffectual against ISIS; nor is there any suggestion that
COIN is the only option. In fact, winning hearts and minds may be
more distracting than going after bank accounts and bottom lines. To
imply my article recommends the United States and its partners “arrest”
and “incarcerate” members of ISIS in Syria and Iraq is a facile interpretation. As the recent Special Forces raid in Syria that killed Abu Sayyaf
attests—there was little need to Mirandize the purportedly central
figure in ISIS’s economic organization in order to hurt ISIS. Does Major
Warren suggest the information gained from the raid on the inner workings of ISIS and its finances be discarded, or the raid itself should have
been shelved in favor of some sort of conventional campaign? Is he
recommending the US forego its current efforts to cripple the illicit
financial networks that underpin ISIS’s power?
Major Warren implies the strategic choices when employing an
integrated financial and military strategy are binary rather than complementary. Using financial tools against a foe does not immediately lead
to COIN (or to nation-building) or preclude a conventional military
approach. The choice is not a binary one—it’s not “tanks or banks.”
A conventional military approach can also include a component of
economic warfare waged against a proto-state like ISIS. The history of
conventional wars is also the history of embargoes and sanctions that
were part and parcel of a broader strategy to bring down an adversary.
The notion that conventional fighting alone can be credited for the
small set of examples Major Warren lists at the end of his commentary
is a narrow approach for what is clearly a broader problem. Although
history is not my discipline, I am fairly certain the enemies in those wars
did not use illicit financing to pay for online propaganda and internet
recruitment efforts to draw more foreigners into the fray, or to pay for
expanding their franchise to countries in other continents.
If, as Major Warren argues, “Victory is achievable through the
employment of conventional forces accompanied by competent local
allies, such as the Kurds,” then I am confused. I believe the US Air
Force is a conventional force that has already been employed along with
the Kurds against ISIS targets in the current campaign. The Iraqi military and moderate Syrian rebels may not be “competent local allies” in
the eyes of Major Warren; but, it is unfortunate that he should discard
“training and officer exchanges” because he believes they represent
how social science has “overly influenced military doctrine.” Perhaps
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his commentary is merely an argument for a larger role for conventional
US ground forces in an expanded war across both Syria and Iraq. Should
policy makers decide to accept such an escalation, the ensuing campaign
could also be augmented by a financial strategy to weaken ISIS. The
successful ground operations against Hussein’s Iraq followed years of
sanctions and the tracing of his regime’s illicit finances. These economic
efforts hobbled Iraq’s ability to replace military equipment and train its
forces, contributing to coalition military operations against the increasingly economically fragile nation.
To be sure, an integrated military and financial strategy is not a
tonic for ill-conceived policy choices. However, the inclusion of financial efforts in whatever types of wars the United States wages—COIN
or conventional or some mixture—against a foe like ISIS should not be
removed from serious strategic discussions.

